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IAM v. OPEC:
POLITICAL QUESTION OR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY?
An analysis of the recent suit brought by the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (hereinafter IAM)
against the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (herein-
after OPEC) 1 and its thirteen members2 emphasizes the growing
necessity for judicial and legislative action, both municipally and
internationally, to establish an effective order for the world econ-
omy. The courts of the United States and, moreover, any inter-
national adjudicatory body, be it the United Nations or an inter-
national arbitral tribunal, will be called upon in the future to make
decisions concerning the impact of such international commodity
organizations.
In its suit IAM charged that the price-setting activities of OPEC
and its thirteen member nations violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 3 The injury IAM alleged was the payment, by its members, of
1. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F.
Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
2. OPEC members as of the date suit was initiated were Algeria,
Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.
3. Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L.
higher prices for gasoline at the service station pumps as a conse-
quence of OPEC's anticompetitive actions.4 IAM requested damages
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act 5 and injunctive relief under Sec-
tion 16 of the Clayton Act 6 to enjoin the price setting activities of
OPEC and its member nations.
Jurisdiction was claimed to be based upon the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act of 19767 (hereinafter FSIA) as well as upon
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every per-
son who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other per-
son, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceed-
ing three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
4. 477 F. Supp. at 559 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
5. Section 15 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in
any district court of the United States in the district in which the de-
fendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained ....
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 26 states in part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association, shall be entitled to sue
for and have iniunctive relief, in any court of the United States hav-
ing jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by
a violation of the antitrust laws ....
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(d), 1391,1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976). The FSIA
provides for a general scheme of immunities of foreign states from the jurisdic-
tion of United States courts. It in fact codifies the so-called restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, whereby the immunity of a foreign state is "restricted" to
suits involving a foreign state's public acts (jure imperil) and does not extend to
suits based on its commercial or private acts (ure gestionis). Although the re-
strictive view was nominally approved of by the Department of State in its "Tate
Letter," 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952), there has always been an avenue of
escape for nations whereby they could request the Department to make a formal
suggestion of immunity to the courts. The Act, then, relieves the Department of
State from entering the decision-making process and leaves the question of in-
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the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
The court initially found that OPEC could not legally be served
under the FSIA as it is not a foreign sovereign 8 and so dismissed the
organization from the lawsuit.
9
The court proceeded to discuss the claims against the thirteen
nation defendants, and dismissed the damage portion of IAM's
claim. The court found that IAM had not alleged any direct pur-
chase of oil from the defendant nations. Thus, IAM was found to
be an "indirect" purchaser of and from the defendants with respect
to the gasoline it purchased in the United States. 10 As an indirect
munity solely to. the courts, as is customary in many other nations.
The provision invoked by the plaintiffs was 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) which
provides in part:
(a) A foreign state shall not bc immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . (2) in
which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the
United States....
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) defines "foreign state" to include a "political
subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."
An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is further defined to mean any
entity: "(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and (2)
which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof..."
9. The court also found that OPEC could not be served under the Inter-
national Organizations Immunities Act because that Act applies only to those
international organizations "in which the United States participates," 22 U.S.C.
§ 288 (1976); the United States does not participate in OPEC. 477 F. Supp. at
560.
10. The court stated that the plaintiff would demonstrate no more than
that it bought gasoline at service station pumps in the United States that was, in
part, refined in the United States by American companies from defendants'
crude.
A particular defendant country first sold its crude at its ports. This crude
was resold several times thereafter: through crude buyers, crude shippers, crude
resellers and refineries. After the crude was re-refined into gasoline, it passed
through gasoline distributors, marketing wholesalers and gasoline retailers and
ultimateiy was purchased by the plaintiff at service station pumps. The plaintiff,
19801
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purchaser, IAM was precluded from seeking damages under the hold-
ing of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois1 1 where the Supreme Court held
that a plaintiff in a price fixing case may recover only if it had pur-
chased directly from the alleged price fixer. 12
As to IAM's request for injunctive relief based upon Section 16
of the Clayton Act,1 3 the court found that while the Supreme Court
had spoken clearly and definitively concerning an indirect pur-
chaser's right to seek damages in Illinois Brick, that Court had not
made a definitive statement concerning the right of an individual pur-
chaser to seek injunctive relief. Viewing this issue as an open ques-
tion, the court proceeded to analyze the rationale of the 3rd Circuit
decision in Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group,
Inc. 14 where it was found that Illinois Brick and previous interpreta-
tions do not preclude an indirect purchaser from seeking injunctive
relief. The Court of Appeals in Mid-West Paper concluded that, in
contrast to a suit for damages, a claim for injunctive relief does not
pose the same problems of duplicative or ruinous recoveries or the
possibility of a trial burdened by complex economic analysis.15 Fol-
then, was not a direct purchaser of defendants' foreign crude, but at best, an
indirect purchaser eight times removed from the defendants. Id. at 560-61.
11. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
12. The court also denied plaintiff the use of the so-called pass-on or
pass-through doctrine to establish recovery for damages. This theory would
allow a plaintiff to establish antitrust injury by showing that the additional cost
imposed upon him by the price-fixing defendants had been passed on to him by
the first direct purchaser from the defendants and any intermediate purchasers
along the line.
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481
(1968), the Supreme Court rejected this doctrine as a defense. In Hanover Shoe,
the defendant was accused of monopolizing shoe machinery and attempted to
defend against this charge by asserting that the plaintiff was not injured by
any acts committed by the defendant because the plaintiff, a shoe manufacturer,
passed the additional costs along to the ultimate consumer.
In Illinois Brick, note II supra, the Supreme Court, interpreting its
decision in Hanover Shoe, denied the offensive use of the pass-on theory. The
Court reasoned that to allow the offensive but not the defensive use of the
theory would create a serious risk of multiple liability for defendants. 431 U.S.
at 730-31.
13. 15 U.S.C. §26 (1976).
14. 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
15. Id. at 590. The court compared Section 4 of the Clayton Act (dam-
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lowing the same rationale, the court found that IAM, as an indirect
purchaser, should not be precluded from seeking injunctive relief
under the antitrust laws.16
Turning to the jurisdictional aspect of IAM's claim, the court
proceeded to determine whether or not the thirteen member nations
were immune from suit under the FSIA. 17 The crucial analysis for
determining immunity under the FSIA is whether or not the activity
engaged in by a foreign state is "governmental," thereby rendering
the sovereign immune from suit, or "commercial," thereby rendering
the sovereign amenable to suit as a private party would be. 1 8
The court reviewed the present system of pricing mechanisms1 9
used by the member nations and concluded that a narrow approach
should be taken in defining "commercial activity." 20  Examining
the legislative history 21 of the FSIA, the court was drawn to the con-
clusion that if the activities at issue were of the character which
normally could be engaged in by a private party then a commercial
activity could be assumed, but if the activity was one in which only
ages) with Section 16 (injunctive relief) and found that § 16 does not base in-
junctive relief upon an already sustained injury, rather, that section makes relief
available "against threatened loss or damage." Moreover, the court found that
Linder § 16 the plaintiff only needs to demonstrate "a significant threat of in-
jury" from impending antitrust violations and that a party may have standing
to obtain injunctive relief even when he is denied standing to sue for treble
damages. Id. at 591.
16. In the court's analysis there was a concern that if such plaintiffs are
precluded from seeking injunctive relief they would be left totally without any
remedy. Reasoning that Congress desired effective enforcement procedures
under the antitrust law, the court interpreted Congress' intent to not exclude
such a large class of plaintiffs from protection of the antitrust laws. 577 F.
Supp. at 564.
17. Subject Matter jurisdiction is granted to the district courts to hear
claims against foreign sovereigns under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
18. Section 1603(d) defines "commercial activity" as follows:
A commercial activity means either a regular course of commercial
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The com-
mercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to
the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act,
rather than by reference to its purpose.
19. 477 F. Supp. at 566.
20. Id. at 567.
21. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in,
119761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604 1hereinafter House Report I.
19801
N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L.
a sovereign could engage, the activity would be considered non-
commercial. 22
The court found that the pricing mechanisms of OPEC coun-
tries were not the seminal nature of each nation's oil transactions,
but rather it was production control which occupied these nations'
activities.23  The court concluded that the nature of the activity
engaged in by the OPEC nations was the establishment by a sov-
ereign state of the terms and conditions for the removal of its prime
natural resource-oil. 24  The court looked to international law and
cited a number of United Nations resolutions, 25 in which the United
States had concurred, to back up its conclusion that a sovereign
state has the exclusive power to control its own natural resources.
Reasoning from this premise, the court was of the opinion that
control over a nation's natural resources stemmed from the nature
of its sovereignty, 26 and so, the establishment of terms and condi-
22. House Report, [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6604, 6613.
23. 477 F. Supp. at 566. The court, quoting from expert testimony,
stated:
Control of supply is the essence of monopoly; price fixing the result
the OPEC nations can raise or lower the prices at will by control-
ling the output. Most of the (crude oil) price increases since 1970
have in fact resulted from output restriction. Prices have been raised
by taxation and by direct price quotation. These two methods are
convenient, but not necessary.
24. 477 F. Supp. at 567.
25. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, 327, U.N. Doc. A/C 2/5 R 850
(1962). In part the Resolution states:
The right of people and nations to permanent sovereignty over
their national wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest
of their national development and of the wellbeing of the people of
the State concerned.
We should note that although the court cited the 1962"General Assembly Reso-
lution, to which the United States agreed, the other cited resolutions had been
voted against or abstained from by the United States.
26. 'The court drew upon certain domestic activities analogous to a
nation's role in the marketing of its wealth and natural resources. Citing Parker
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Court said that it has been recognized that
a government has the power to restrict competition of an item to protect the
public welfare and this, necessarily, is a governmental activity. Parker involved
an antitrust challenge to a California state program which controlled the market-
ing of raisins grown in the state so as to restrict competition among the growers
[ Vol. I
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tions for removal of a natural resource from its territory, when done
by a sovereign state, is a governmental activity, and therefore not
subject to suit. 2 7  The court rejected plaintiff's contention that
regardless of this governmental action, the activities of the OPEC
nations in conspiring to fix prices were commercial. 28 Upon finding
that the OPEC nations' activities were not commercial, the Court
said that the defendant nations were entitled to immunity under
the FSIA and that therefore the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 29
Going beyond this aspect of the sovereign immunity claim,
the court addressed some additional concerns in an antitrust suit
of this nature. The court found that even if subject matter juris-
diction did exist IAM would still be precluded from its claim be-
cause a foreign sovereign is not considered a "person" for purposes
of Sherman Act liability.30 Citing Parker v. Brown 31 for the propo-
sition that a domestic state is not a person who may be sued under
the antitrust laws, the court said the same holds true for foreign
nations.32 lAM's contention that subsequent interpretations of
Parker had qualified its holding was similarly rejected by the
court. 3 3
and maintain prices.
27. 477 F. Supp. at 568.
28. Id. at 569.
29. Id.
30. The Sherman Act, at U.S.C. § 7(8), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 12(1), define person "to include corporations and associations existing under
or authorized by the laws of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of
a foreign country."
31. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
32. 477 F. Supp. at 570. The court analyzed a series of cases-where the
status of nations as defendants under antitrust laws was discussed. In Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 78 n. 14 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977), the court, in dicta, concluded that foreign sovereigns were not "per-
sons" subiect to Sherman Act liability. Accord Interamerican Refining Corp. v.
Texas Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970).
33. IAM claimed that Parker had lost its effectiveness through the deci-
sions in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 973 (1975), and LaFayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
In Goldfarb Sherman Act liability was claimed for a minimum fee schedule
published by a local bar association, enforced by the Virginia State Bar. The
Court found for the plaintiff and held that anticompetitive activities must be
19801
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The court went on to discuss the recent Supreme Court ruling
in Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India34 where it was held that a
foreign nation may be a "person" under the antitrust laws as a plain-
tiff. The Court was unwilling to extend the Pfizer ruling to sovereign
defendants, such as OPEC nations, citing an absence of any intent by
Congress to so declare. 35
Aside from the matter of whether OPEC as an organization
could be held to antitrust liability, in cases where foreign cartels
have been sued under the antitrust laws in United States courts, their
members have been private business organizations, usually encour-
aged by their own states. 36 The question of whether or not the anti-
trust laws can be applied to conspiracies among nations which would
otherwise violate our antitrust laws is a novel one and one that the
compelled by direction of the state acting as a sovereign before the Parker doc-
trine may be used.
In LaFayette the Court held that municipalities should not be excluded
from the reach of the antitrust laws, stating that the Parker exemption was
limited to official action directed by the state.
The court in OPEC rejected both claims by IAM, ruling that the actions
complained of were directly mandated by each sovereign nation of OPEC and
no subdivisions of any of the member nations were involved.
34. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
35. The court, in analyzing Ptizer, stated that the determining factor
in such a case was that an adjudication by the courts did not interfere with
sensitive matters of foreign policy. In contrast, allowing foreign nations to be
sued under the antitrust laws would involve intrusion. 477 F. Supp. at 572.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Sumatra Purchasing Co., Criminal No.
15-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1920); United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft,
Equity No. 41-124 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); United States v. 383,340 02 of Quinine
Derivatives, Admiralty No. 98-242 (S.D.N.Y. 1928); United States v. 5898
Cases of Sardines, Admiralty No. 105-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); United States v. The
Tannin Corp., Criminal No. 1 3-260 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
These older cases were not prosecuted to final judgment but they point
to the fact that the United States has had a history of prosecuting foreign car-
tels under the antitrust laws. Brief for Gulf & Western Industries to the Attor-
ney General of the United States, entitled Analysis of OPEC's Stalus under the
United States Antitrust Laws, produced in 1975 by Messrs. Simpson, Thatcher




court in OPEC failed to analyze fully.
In determining whether or not there was subject matter juris-
diction under the FSIA, the court took a narrow approach in defin-
ing the pivotal issue-commercial activity. 37  In contrast to the
court's interpretation of the legislative history, 38 there is specific
mention in the House Report 39 that would give to the courts an
avenue for broad interpretation in defining commercial activity.
4 0
The factors the court chose to focus upon in determining the gov-
ernmental nature of a nation's oil transactions can be viewed in a
different light when the emphasis is not on the individual produc-
tion policy but, rather, upon the efforts of the member nations, indi-
vidually and in concert, to fix prices for their product.
OPEC members, through nationalization of the interests of
oil companies and other measures, have taken an actual ownership
interest in the production and pricing of crude oil.4 1 Thus, these
37. This Court agrees that this "commercial activity" should be
defined narrowly. This determination, while based partially
on the factor mentioned above, is premised primarily on the
recognition that a court must base its ruling on specific facts.
By basing a ruling on a generalized view of the evidence, a
court may be basing its ruling on half-truths.
477 F. Supp. at 567 (emphasis in the original).
38. House Report, [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. News 6604, 6615.
39. Id.
40. "The courts would have a great deal of latitude in determining what
is 'commercial activity' for the purposes of this bill. It has seemed unwise to at-
tempt an excessively precise definition of this term, even if that were practi-
cable." Id.
41. Every OPEC member has ownership interests in the oil companies
operating within its territory. The governments of Iran and Iraq have total
ownership and control of production. The remaining OPEC members have
stated their intention of acquiring 100% ownership in the near future. Presently
these latter countries have controlling interests in the producing companies,
usually on a 60%-40/o basis.
The following is a breakdown of each nation's structure in oil transactions:
Algeria Sonatrach is the government enterprise, controlling 75%-80% of
Algeria's oil flow.
Ecuador The government-owned company CEPE has twenty-year service con-
tracts with foreign oil companies. The government takes 85% of the
profits.
Indonesia Pertamina is the state-owned oil and gas agency. Approximately 35
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nations have actually stepped into the shoes of the international oil
corporations. Moreover, many member nation companies have gone
beyond mere pricing/production activity and are engaged in building
refineries and tanker fleets. 42
The legislative history emphasizes that the type of business
that these nations are engaged in was to be encompassed within the
definition of commercial activity.43 Yet the court concluded that
companies have production sharing contracts with Pertamina.
Iran Total government ownership through the National Iranian Oil
Company (N lOG).
Iraq Total government ownership through Iraq National Oil Company
(INOC).
Kuwait Total government ownership through Kuwait National Oil Company.
Libya The Libyan National Oil Company intends a 100116 takeover in the
future but extracts 85% of profits from foreign oil companies
operating in Libya.
Nigeria The Nigerian National Oil Company has a 55% interest in producing
companies (Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum).
Qatar Direct government ownership of oil-producing facilities; near 100%
but Shell Oil still has some interest.
Saudi Petromin is the state-owned oil company and transacts in concert
Arabia with American companies under Aramco.
United The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, established in 1971, has
Arab plans to acquire 100% of the oil production facilities.
Emirates
Venezuela Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation (CVP) is moving towards 100%
control when present concessions expire in the I 980s.
Compiled from OPEC Analysis Brief, Appendix A and K. HOSSAIN, LAW AND
POLICY IN PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT (1979).
42. Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and OAPEC, the Organization of Arab
Petroleum Exporting Countries, have completed, or are in the process of com-
pleting, ventures into tanker fleets for shipping oil. Moreover, these countries
are working on exploration projects for oil in other parts of the world. OPEC
Analysis Brief at A-i.
43. A regular course of commercial conduct includes the carrying
on of a commercial enterprise such as a mineral extracting
company. . . . Certainly, if an activity is customarily carried
on for profit, its commercial nature could readily be assumed.
Activities such as a foreign government's sale of a service
or a product . . . would be among those included within the
1 Vol. I
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the nature of the activity, controlling production, was purely a gov-
ernmental activity derived from each nation's status as a sovereign.
44
It is true that these nations' policies concerning oil production are a
function of their governments, but can it be said that the nature of
the activity is, therefore, purely governmental simply because oil
happens to be the primary product of the OPEC nations? At what
point does a government policy setting supply quotas metamorphose
into the proprietary function of selling the product?45
In taking a narrow approach in defining "commercial activity"
the Court was guided by its understanding of the legislative intent
that the FSIA was meant "to keep our courts away from those areas
that touch very closely upon the sensitive nerves of foreign coun-
tries." 46  Reviewing that history we find there is evidence that the
Court was misguided in its interpretation of the purposes of the Act.
We find that the stated purpose of the Act is not a guide for courts
to determine when they shouldn't address matters which may involve
a nation's sensitive policy concerns, but rather to rid the Executive
departments of burdensome questions of sovereign immunity,
definition.
House Report, 119761 U.s. CoDe CoNG. & Ao. NEws 6604, 6614-15.
44. 477 F. Supp. at 568-69 n. 14.
45. The court noted that the proprietary function of the OPEC nations
was preceded by the governmental function and concluded that the essential
nature of the activity was therefore governmental. This anomalous conclusion
bears no connection to the legislative history nor to comparable situations
which are necessarily commercial.
In an era of growing socialism, governments worldwide do engage in com-
mercial enterprises. The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is followed in
socialist as well as capitalist countries and merely holds that when a government
does engage in a commercial enterprise it, like private enterprise, is accountable
in the courts of other nations.
One commentator has stated that the reason for the restrictive theory
evolving to the majority view was the fact that states were becoming increasingly
involved in commercial and trading activities. In particular, the appearance of
the Soviet Union in international affairs propelled the restrictive theory, the
thought being that the Soviets shouldn't be able to hide under the claim of
sovereignty. See, von Mehren, Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 17
COL. J. TRANS. LAw 33 (1978).
46. 477 F. Supp. at 567.
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thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of such tasks.47
The Act, therefore, provides a clear mandate for courts to apply
the law and to make decisions on a neutral basis.
In determining the governmental/commercial issue the court
examined certain principles of international law, 48 in particular the
right of nations to control their own natural resources. In contrast
to this principle, when we look to the commercial nature of cartel
activity we find a history in international law which was meant to
thwart restrictive trade practices. In the Charter of the United
Nations49 the principles of international economic cooperation
are clearly delineated. Among these are that efforts should be made
by all nations to create conditions of world economic stability
and to find solutions, cooperatively, to world economic ills. The
actions of restrictive trade practices, such as those taken by OPEC,
are obviously not meant to promote such higher principles.
Similarly, in 1947-48 representatives of 53 nations including
the United States, drafted the so-called Havana Charter5d establish-
ing an International Trade Organization (ITO). Primary among its
concerns was the inclusion of articles designed to remedy the de-
structive effects of "cartelization" of international trade.51  As
47. "Although the State Department espouses the restrictive principle
of immunity, the foreign state may attempt to bring diplomatic influence upon
the State Department's determination. A principal purpose of this bill is to
transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to
the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of im-
munity determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions
are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process."
House Report, [1976] U.s. CoDE CoNG. &'AD. NEws 6604, 6606.
48. 477 F. Supp. at 567.
49. U.N. CHART-ER art. 55.
50. Bronz, The International Trade Organization Charter, 62 HARV. L.
REv. 1089 (1949). The Charter was initially promoted by the United States but
was never acted upon by the Senate.
51. I.T.O. CHARTER art. 46. This article dealt exclusively with restric-
tive practices, e.g., price fixing and production limitations. The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is the vestige of the doomed I.T.O. Still, the
stated purposes of this agreement are the "reduction of tariffs and other barriers
to trade and ...the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce ....." T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 308.
[Vol. I
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recently as 1975, the United Nations has reiterated its call for the
goal of stability in world economic order under the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States. 52 To say, on the one hand,
that international law allows a nation to control its own natural
resources, as the court stated, while closing its eyes to the purposes
behind that control, clearly inapposite of stated international prin-
ciples, is to disregard the larger global context within which nation
states transact. The court failed to grasp the dynamics of the con-
flicting policies and took the narrow approach.
The court went on to discuss the extraterritorial application
of antitrust laws to foreign nations. Under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act 53 two iurisdictional requirements are posed: (1) that there be
a restraint of United States commerce; and (2) that the violations
occur in the context of interstate or foreign commerce.
When the conduct allegedly constituting restraint of trade is
committed entirely outside of the United States the question then
posed is whether or not the activity has some effect upon United
States commerce. 54 In the landmark case of United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America5 5 (hereinafter Alcoa) the potential of the
antitrust laws in combating foreign cartels was recognized. There,
Judge Learned Hand concluded that although Congress did not
intend the Act to prohibit conduct having no effect in the United
States, it did intend the Act to reach conduct having consequences
within this country.
The key to liability under the antitrust laws for acts committed
52. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281,
Ch. II, Art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (1974). Under Article 5,
states do have a right to associate in organizations of prime commodity pro-
ducers but those countries have a reciprocal duty not to prohibit the "promo-
tion of sustained growth of the world economy."
53. See note 3, supra.
54. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
55. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Alcoa involved a cartel agreement
between French, German, Swiss and British ingot producers, and a Canadian sub-
sidiary of Alcoa, Limited. These firms had formed a Swiss corporation, Alliance,
and had subscribed to its stock in proportion to their production capacities.
Under the agreement, Alliance fixed the production quotas. See also United
States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc. 119631
TRADE CASES (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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abroad is, as Judge Hand declared, whether such agreements among
foreign producers are intended to, and do, have a direct and substan-
tial impact on commerce in the United States. It is apparent that
this test is fully satisfied by the actions of OPEC nations. The price
increases promoted by OPEC not only have increased the price of
crude oil imported into this country, but have resulted in raising
the prices of most goods and services and creating widespread unem-
ployment and economic dislocation.
The recent Ninth Circuit decision in Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A. 56 (hereinafter Timber/ane)
suggests a "balancing of foreign interests" approach in determining
whether or not a court should apply American antitrust laws extra-
territorially. 57  The Court proposed a number of elements to be
analyzed in weighing the interests at stake:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict
with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of
the parties and the locations or principal places of business
of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by
either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the
relative significance of effects on the United States as
compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there
is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce,
the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative impor-
tance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad. 58
The court in Timberlane then says that if there are still sufficient
interests of the United States at stake, application of the laws is
proper.
Applying these factors to the interests at stake in OPEC we
find: (1) the conflict of policy and law between the United States
56. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
57. This balancing approach was followed by the Supreme Court in
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). In
Continental the involvement of the Canadian government in the alleged
monopolization was held not to require dismissal. The Court was of the opinion
that there was no substantial involvement by the Canadian government and
therefore the government's interest was considered slight when weighed against
the American interest in thwarting restraint practices.
58. 549 F.2d at 614. These factors have also been endorsed by the




and the OPEC nations is, on the surface, great but in reality not so
diverse when we consider that these nations would similarly abhor
restrictive practices in other commodity dealings, e.g., grain sales;
(2) the nationalities involved include injuries to American plaintiffs
and, moreover, these nations transact continually through United
States corporations; (3) enforcing a judgment may seem a near im-
possibility but under the FSIA there are provisions authorizing
execution upon the commercial assets of a sovereign nation if the
property was used for the commercial activity upon which the
claim was based 59 -(here we should recognize, e.g., an attachment
proceeding upon the OPEC nations' profits maintained in accounts
in United States banks); (4) the effects of OPEC nations' activities
upon the United States economy has been dramatic, e.g., inflation,
unemployment, depreciation of the dollar; (5) the purposeful
actions of oil producing nations to harm the American economy and
its consumer is manifest in sundry declarations by their oil ministers
and heads of government; e.g., the Shah of Iran had frequently pro-
posed tying the price of oil to the index of manufactured goods in
the United States. 60
From this analysis it would appear that such behavior on the
part of OPEC nations was intended to affect United States com-
merce. Following the Timberlane reasoning there is an overwhelming
interest in applying antitrust liability to counter the price-fixing
activities of these nations.6 1
The court in OPEC addressed the problem of whether or not
foreign sovereigns could be defendants in antitrust actions and con-
cluded that a foreign sovereign is not a "person" within the meaning
of the Sherman Act. 6 2 In support of this statutory interpretation,
the court cited the recent decision in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. 63 and
the older decision in Interamerican Refining Corporation v. Texaco
Maracaibo, Inc.64  It is interesting to note that both of these cases
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1976).
60. OPEC WEEKLY BULL.. Jan. 29, 1971, at 7.
61. The Third Circuit followed a similar balancing technique in Man-
nington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
62. 477 F. Supp. at 571. See note 3, supra.
63. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
64. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
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were decided prior to the enactment of the FSIA 6 5 and involved no
direct challenge to a foreign sovereign's actions. Those courts, only
by way of dicta, discussed the foreign sovereign defendant issue.
Thus, the interpretations by the court in OPEC would seem to revert
us back to the outdated doctrine of American Banana, long criticized
by subsequent decisions.6
6
It seems most likely that when the Sherman Act was adopted
foreign governments were not intended to fall within the definition
of "person." Sovereign states were engaged in their usual activities
of sovereignty and not in commercial endeavors, as practiced on such
a wide scale today. Early interpretations of the Sherman Act can be
viewed as authorizing a broad and all-inclusive power over restrictive
trade activities.67  Indeed, the Act, similar to the Constitution, has
been regarded as a broad charter which can be applied to new cir-
cumstances within its principles, even though the specific problem
was not contemplated by its framers. 68
The court in OPEC felt bound by the precedents holding
against enforcing antitrust liability to foreign sovereigns. Yet when
we look at the history of the FSIA, as originally proposed in Con-
gress, we find specific mention of restrictive trade practices by
65. In Hunt v. Mobil Oil, only Sherman Act and Wilson Tariff Act
jurisdiction were claimed. Jurisdiction in Inter American was based on the
Sherman Act and Clayton Act.
66. See, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909);
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. General
Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
67. In Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,59 (1911),
the Court said that an all-embracing, generic enumeration was essential to ensure
that those new forms of contract or combination that unduly restrained inter-
state or foreign commerce would not escape condemnation.
Further, the generic enumeration used in the statute, together with the
absence of any definition of restraint of trade, permitted but one conclusion:
the express design of the statute was to fix clearly the ulterior boundaries that
cannot be transgressed with impunity and thus to allow reasonable application
of the public policy embodied in the statute without unnecessarily limiting its
enforcement by precise definition. 221 U.S. at 63-64.
68. In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60
(1933), the Court stated: "As a charter of freedom, the Act has a generality
and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions."
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nations as a cause of action within the reach of the Act.69 Addi-
tionally, the court was unwilling to extend the recent Pfizer 70 de-
cision which opened American courts to foreign government plain-
tiffs under the antitrust laws, holding there that nations were "per-
sons" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. It would seem that
when the spirit of the Sherman Act is violated by governments, ap-
plication of the law should not be impaired by favoring govern-
ments for purposes of remedies while exempting them for purposes
of liability. OPEC nations have in the past utilized our courts to
prosecute claims arising from their commercial activities. There
seems to be little justification for using a double standard in order
to immunize their commercial activities from judicial scrutiny.
The activities of the OPEC nations have injured the interests
of the United States severely and if such activity were carried on
by private parties it would clearly violate the law. The policy of the
case law and the FSIA is not to protect government commercial
action under sovereign immunity. The court in OPEC failed to
consider the larger implications of this destructive activity and ap-
proached the problem narrowly.
Considering the serious domestic impacts and the adverse im-
pacts on the friendly oil-consuming nations, the court should have
been more responsive to the elasticity which is permitted in the in-
terpretation of the antitrust laws. It would seem that a new per-
spective on antitrust applicability is needed to meet modern eco-
nomic dilemmas in a world where nations fail to adhere to common
principles of fair trading and maximum economic growth.
Idealistic as this may sound, we will most certainly be faced in
the future with similar prime commodity cartel arrangements, mod-
eled after OPEC, as the world depletes the bulk of its resources more
rapidly than it can develop them. One method for stemming the
prospect of future economic instability and dislocation is for our in-
stitutions, including our courts, to realize their great duty as decision
makers.
Charles G. Sturcken
69. It was stated in the section analysis to the legislation proposed in
1973 that a cause of action arising out of restrictive trade practices by an agency
or instrumentality of a foreign state having a direct effect within the territory of
the United States would be within the purview of the Act. H.R. REP. No. 3493,
93d Cong. 1st Sess. 41 (1973).
70. Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
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